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Strategic Topology Switching for Security–Part II:
Detection & Switching Topologies
Yanbing Mao, Emrah Akyol, and Ziang Zhang
Abstract—This two-part paper considers strategic topology
switching for security in the second-order multi-agent system.
In Part II, we propose a strategy on switching topologies to
detect zero-dynamics attack (ZDA), whose attack-starting time
is allowed to be not the initial time. We first characterize the
sufficient and necessary condition for detectability of ZDA, in
terms of the network topologies to be switched to and the
set of agents to be monitored. We then propose an attack
detection algorithm based on the Luenberger observer, using
the characterized detectability condition. Employing the strategy
on switching times proposed in Part I [1] and the strategy on
switching topologies proposed here, a strategic topology-switching
algorithm is derived. Its primary advantages are threefold: (i)
in achieving consensus in the absence of attacks, the control
protocol does not need velocity measurements and the algorithm
has no constraint on the magnitudes of coupling weights; (ii)
in tracking system in the absence of attacks, the Luenberger
observer has no constraint on the magnitudes of observer gains
and the number of monitored agents, i.e., only one monitored
agent’s output is sufficient; (iii) in detecting ZDA, the algorithm
allows the defender to have no knowledge of the attack-starting
time and the number of misbehaving agents (i.e., agents under
attack). Simulations are provided to verify the effectiveness of
the strategic topology-switching algorithm.
Index Terms—Multi-agent system, strategic topology switching,
zero-dynamics attack, attack-starting time, attack detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN Part-I paper [1], the proposed simplified control protocolunder switching topology employs only relative positions
of agents, which is different from the well-studied control
protocols [2]–[8]. The main objective of this two-part paper
is the strategic topology-switching algorithm for the second-
order multi-agent system under attack. The algorithm is based
on two strategies, one of which on switching times and the
other on switching topologies. The strategy on switching
times, as introduced in Part-I paper [1], enables the second-
order multi-agent system in the absence of attacks to reach the
second-order consensus. The strategy on switching topologies
proposed in this Part-II paper enables the strategic topology-
switching algorithm to detect stealthy attacks.
Security concerns regarding the networked systems pose
a formidable threat to their wide deployment, as highlighted
by the recent incidents including distributed denial-of-service
(DDOS) attack on Estonian web sites [9], Maroochy water
breach [10] and cyber attacks on smart grids [11]. The
“networked” aspect exacerbates the difficulty of securing these
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systems since centralized measurement (sensing) and control
are not feasible for such large-scale systems [12], and hence
require the development of decentralized approaches, which
are inherently prone to attacks. Particularly, a special class of
”stealthy” attacks, namely the “zero-dynamics attack” (ZDA),
poses a significant security challenge [13]–[15]. The main
idea behind ZDA is to hide the attack signal in the null-
space of the state-space representation of the control system
so that it cannot be detected by applying conventional de-
tection methods on the observation signal (hence, the name
“stealthy”). The objective of such an attack can vary from
manipulating the controller to accept false data that would
yield the system towards a desired (e.g., unstable) state to
maliciously altering system dynamics (topology attack [16])
to affect system trajectory.
Recent research efforts have focused on variations of ZDA
for systems with distinct properties. For stochastic cyber-
physical systems, Park et al. [17] designed a robust ZDA,
where the attack-detection signal is guaranteed to stay be-
low a threshold over a finite horizon. In [18], Kim et al.
proposed a discretized ZDA for the sampled-date control
systems, where the attack-detection signal is constantly zero
at the sampling times. Another interesting line of research
pertains to developing defense strategies [12], [19]–[22]. For
example, Jafarnejadsani et al. [14], [23] proposed a multi-rate
L1 adaptive controller which can detect ZDA in the sampled-
data control systems, by removing certain unstable zeros of
discrete-time systems [13], [15]. Back et al. [24] utilized
“generalized hold” to render the impact of bounded ZDA.
While developing defense strategies for the ZDAs in multi-
agent systems have recently gained interest [12], [19]–[22]
(see Table I for a brief summary), the space of solutions is
yet to be thoroughly explored. The most prominent features
of prior work are that the conditions of detectable attack
have constrain the connectivity of network topology and
the number of the misbehaving agents (referred to agents
under attack) [12], [19]–[21], and the corresponding developed
defense strategy for attack detection works effectively only in
situation where the number of misbehaving agents and the
attack-starting time being the initial time are known to the
defender [12], [19], [20], [22], [25], [26]. The main objective
of this work is to remove such constraints and unrealistic
assumptions by utilizing a new approach for attack detection:
intentional topology switching.
Recent experiment of stealthy false-data injection attacks
on networked control system [27] showed the changes in the
system dynamics could be utilized by defender to detect ZDA.
To have changes in the system dynamics, Teixeira et al. [25]
2proposed a method of modifying output matrix through adding
and removing observed measurements, or modifying input
matrix through adding and removing actuators or perturbing
the control input matrix. But the defense strategy requires
the attack-starting times to be the initial time and known
to defender. In other words, the defense strategy fails to
work if the attack-starting time is designed to be not the
initial time and the defender has no such knowledge, as
is practically the case for most scenarios. In such realistic
scenario, to detect ZDA, the system dynamics must have
dynamic changes, i.e., some parameters of system dynamics
changes infinitely over infinite time. However, before using the
dynamic changes to detect ZDA in such realistic situation, the
question that whether the dynamic changes in system dynamics
can destroy system stability in the absence of attacks? must
be investigated. If the dynamic changes can destroy system
stability in the absence of attacks, these changes could utilized
by adversary/attacker [28]–[30].
In recent several years, actively/strategically topology
switching has received significantly attention in the control
theory, network science and graph theory literatures, see
e.g., Amelkin and Singh [31] proposed edge recommenda-
tion to disable external influences of adversaries in social
networks (consensus-seeking social dynamics), while the cou-
pling weights are uncontrollable since they correspond to the
users’ interpersonal appraisals; Mao and Akyol [32], [33]
showed that strategic (time-dependent) topology switching is
an effective method in detecting ZDA in the coupled harmonic
oscillators; Ciftcioglu et al. [30] studied dynamic topology
design in the adversary environment where the network de-
signer continually and strategically change network topology
to a denser state, while the adversary attempts to thwart the
defense strategy simultaneously.
Moreover, driven by recent developments in mobile com-
puting, wireless communication and sensing [34], it is more
feasible to set communication topology as a control vari-
able [35]. These motivate us to consider the method of
topology switching to induce changes in the dynamics of
multi-agent systems to detect ZDA. The strategy on switching
times proposed in Part-I paper [1] answers the question: when
the topology of network should switch such that the occurring
dynamic changes in system dynamics do not undermine the
agent’s ability of reaching consensus in the absence of attacks.
Based on the work in Part-I paper [1], this Part-II paper focuses
on the strategy on switching topologies that addresses the
problem of switching to what topologies to detect ZDA.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold, which can be
summarized as follows.
• A ZDA variation is first studied, whose attack-starting
time can be not the initial time.
• We characterize the sufficient and necessary condition
for detectability of the ZDA variation under strategic
topology switching.
• We characterize the sufficient and necessary condition for
Luenberger observer in tracking real multi-agent system
in the absence of attacks, which has no constraint on the
number of monitored agents.
Table I
CONDITIONS ON DETECTABLE ATTACK
Reference Conditions Dynamics
[19] connectivity is not smaller than 2|K| + 1 Discrete Time
[20] |K| is smaller than connectivity Discrete Time
[12] size of input-output linking is smaller than |K| Continuous Time
[21] the minimum vertex separator is larger than |K|+1 Discrete Time
[22] single attack, i.e., |K| = 1 Continuous Time
• Based on the strategy on switching times and the strategy
on switching topologies, through employing Luenberger
observer, a strategic topology-switching algorithm for
attack detection is proposed. The advantages of the al-
gorithm are: i) in detecting ZDA, it allows the defender
to have no knowledge of misbehaving agents and the
attack-starting time; ii) in tracking real systems in the
absence of attacks, it has no constraint on the magnitudes
of observer gains and the number of monitored agents;
iii) in achieving the second-order consensus, it has no
constraint on the magnitudes of coupling weights, while
the control protocol does not need velocity measurements.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the pre-
liminaries and the problem formulation in Sections II and
III respectively. In Section IV, we characterize the condition
for detectability of ZDA. Based on this characterization, we
develop an attack detection algorithm in Section V. We provide
numerical simulation results in Section VI, and, in Section VII
we discuss the future research directions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We use P < 0 to denote a negative definite matrix P . Rn
and Rm×n denote the set of n-dimensional real vectors and
the set of m × n-dimensional real matrices, respectively. Let
C denote the set of complex number. N represents the set of
the natural numbers and N0 = N ∪ {0}. Let 1n×n and 0n×n
be the n × n-dimensional identity matrix and zero matrix,
respectively. 1n ∈ Rn and 0n ∈ Rn denote the vector with all
ones and the vector with all zeros, respectively. The superscript
‘⊤’ stands for matrix transpose.
The interaction among n agents is modeled by an undirected
graphG = (V,E), where V = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of agents
and E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges. The weighted adjacency
matrix A = [aij ] ∈ Rn×n is defined as aij = aji > 0 if
(i, j) ∈ E, and aij = aji = 0 otherwise. Assume that there
are no self-loops, i.e., for any i ∈ V, aii = 0. The Laplacian
matrix of an undirected graph G is defined as L = [lij ] ∈
Rn×n, where lii =
n∑
j=1
aij and lij = −aij for i 6= j.
Some important notations are highlighted as follows:
lcm(·) : operator of least common multiple among scalers;
ker (Q) : set {y : Qy = 0n, Q ∈ Rn×n};
A−1F set {y : Ay ∈ F};
|V| : cardinality (i.e., size) of the set V;
V\K : complement set of K with respect to V;
λi (M) : i
th eigenvalue of matrix M ∈ Rn×n;
S (r) : rth element of ordered set S;
µP (·) : matrix measure of induced P -norm;
3Q : set of rational numbers.
B. Attack Model
As a class of stealthy attacks, “zero-dynamics” attack is
hard to detect, identify, and then mitigate from a control theory
perspective [13]–[15]. Before reviewing its attack policy, let
us first consider the following system:
z˙ (t) = Az (t) , (1a)
y (t) = Cz (t) , (1b)
where z(t) ∈ Rn¯ and y(t) ∈ Rm¯ denote system state and
monitored output, respectively; A ∈ Rn¯×n¯, C ∈ Rm¯×n¯. Its
corresponding version under attack is described by
˙˜z (t) = Az˜ (t) +Bg(t), (2a)
y˜ (t) = Cz˜ (t) +Dg(t), (2b)
where g(t) ∈ Ro¯ is attack signal, B ∈ Rn¯×o¯ and D ∈ Rm¯×o¯.
The policy of ZDA with introduction of attack-starting time
is presented in the following definition, which is different from
the attack policies studied in [12], [19], [20], [22], [25], [26],
whose attack-starting times are the initial time.
Definition 1: The attack signal
g(t) =
{
geη(t−ρ), t ∈ [ρ,∞)
0o¯, t ∈ [0, ρ) (3)
in system (2) is a zero-dynamics attack, if 0n¯ 6= z˜(0)−z(0) ∈
Rn¯, 0o¯ 6= g(ρ) ∈ Ro¯, ρ ≥ 0 and η ∈ C satisfy
z˜ (0)− z (0) ∈ ker (O) , if ρ > 0 (4a)[
eAρ (z˜ (0)− z (0))
−g (ρ)
]
∈ ker
([
η1n¯×n¯ −A B
−C D
])
, (4b)
where
O ,
[
C⊤ (CA)
⊤
. . .
(
CAn¯−1
)⊤ ]⊤
. (5)
Corollary 1: Under the ZDA (4), the states and monitored
outputs of systems (2) and (1) satisfy
y (t) = y˜ (t) , for all t ≥ 0 (6)
z˜ (t) =
{
eAtz˜ (0) , t ∈ [0, ρ]
z (t) + (z˜ (ρ)− z (ρ)) eη(t−ρ), t ∈ (ρ,∞) . (7)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: The state solution (7) shows that through choos-
ing the parameter η and also the attack-starting time ρ, the
attacker can achieve various objectives, see e.g.,
• ρ =∞: altering the steady-state value while not affecting
system stability;
• ρ <∞, Re (η) > 0: making system unstable;
• ρ < ∞, Re (η) = 0, Im (η) 6= 0: causing oscillatory
behavior.
The output (6) indicates the undetectable/stealthy property of
proposed ZDA (3).
Remark 2 (Mixed Stealthy Attacks): To launch the ZDA,
the attacker must modify initial condition; otherwise, z˜ (0)−
z (0) = 0n¯, e
Aρ(z˜ (0) − z (0)) = 0n¯, which with (4b)
implies that Bg(ρ) = 0n¯ and Dg(ρ) = 0m¯. Thus, the attack
signal (3) does not have any effect on the system (2). The
attack policy (4) in conjunction with the property (6) implies
that in the situation where ρ > 0, i.e., the attack-starting time is
not the initial time, the attack strategy comprises two stealthy
attacks, which can be well illustrated in the example of cyber-
physcial systems:
• Before the starting time ρ, the attacker injects false data
to the data of initial condition sent to the Luenberger
observer (attack detector [12]) in cyber layer, while
keeping stealthy, i.e., y (t) = y˜ (t) for t ∈ [0, ρ).
• At the starting time ρ, the attacker introduces signals of
ZDA g(t) = geη(t−ρ), t ≥ ρ, to the system.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
For simplicity, we let the increasingly ordered set M ,
{1, 2, . . .} ⊆ V denote the set of monitored agents.
A. System in The Absence of Attacks
Under the simplified control protocol proposed in [1], the
second-order multi-agent system with monitored outputs is
described by
x˙i (t) = vi (t) (8a)
v˙i (t) =
n∑
j=1
a
σ(t)
ij (xj (t)− xi (t)), i ∈ V (8b)
yj (t) = xj(t), j ∈ M (8c)
where xi(t) ∈ R is the position, vi(t) ∈ R is the velocity,
yj (t) ∈ R is the output of monitored agent i used to detect
stealthy attack, σ(t) : [0,∞) → S , {1, 2, . . . , s}, is
the topology-switching signal. Here, σ(t) = pk ∈ S for
t ∈ [tk, tk+1) means the pth topology is activated over time
interval [tk, tk+1), k ∈ N0, and apkij is the entry of the weighted
adjacency matrix which describes the activated pth topology of
communication network.
B. System in The Presence of Attacks
We usually refer to an agent under attack as a misbehaving
agent [20]. We let K ⊆ V denote the set of misbehaving
agents. The multi-agent system (8) under ZDA is described
by
˙˜xi (t) = v˜i (t) (9a)
˙˜vi (t) =
n∑
i=1
a
σ˜(t)
ij (x˜j (t)− x˜i (t)) +
{
g˜i(t), i ∈ K
0, i ∈ V\K (9b)
y˜j (t) = x˜j(t), j ∈M (9c)
where gi (t) is the ZDA signal in the form of (3):
g˜i (t) =
{
gie
η(t−ρ), t ∈ [ρ,∞)
0, otherwise.
(10)
We note that system (9) can equivalently transforms to a
switched system under attack:
˙˜z (t) = Aσ˜(t)z˜ (t) + g (t) (11a)
y˜ (t) = Cz˜ (t) (11b)
4where we define the following variables and matrices:
Aσ˜(t) ,
[
0n×n 1n×n
−Lσ˜(t) 0n×n
]
, (12a)
C ,
[
e1 . . . e|M| 0|M|×2n−|M|
]⊤
, (12b)
z˜ (t) ,
[
x˜1 (t) . . . x˜n (t) v˜1 (t) . . . v˜n (t)
]⊤
, (12c)
g (t) ,
[
0⊤n a
⊤ (t)
]⊤
, (12d)
[a (t)]i,
{
g˜i (t) , i ∈ K
0, i ∈ V\K (12e)
where ei ∈ Rn is the ith vector of the canonical basis. In
addition, system (8) equivalently transforms to a switched
system:
z˙ (t) = Aσ(t)z (t) (13a)
y (t) = Cz (t) . (13b)
We present the definition of time-dependent switching,
which is part of our defense strategy.
Definition 2: The topology-switching signals σ(t) and σ˜(t)
in multi-agent systems (11) and (13) are said to be time-
dependent if the switching times and topologies depend only
on time, such that
σ(t) = σ˜(t), for all t ≥ 0. (14)
We made the following assumptions on the attacker and
defender.
Assumption 1: The attacker
1) knows the currently activated topology and its dwell time;
2) has the memory of the past switching sequences.
Assumption 2: The defender
1) designs the switching sequences including switching
times and topologies;
2) has no knowledge of the attack-starting time;
3) has no knowledge of the number of misbehaving agents.
C. Attack-Starting Time
The attack-starting time ρ of the signal (3) plays a critical
role in guaranteeing the stealthy property (6), which can be
utilized by the attacker to escape from being detected by the
defense strategy of modifying input or output matrix [25]
finitely over finite time. If the attack-starting time is not rea-
sonable, the changes in system dynamics induced by attacker’s
action “start attack” at ρ can be used by defender to detect
the stealthy attack. Therefore, from the perspective of stealthy
attack design, it is not trivial to study how the attacker should
use its knowledge and memory to decide the attack-starting
time to guarantee its stealthy.
Before presenting the selection scheme of attack-starting
time, let us define:
z˘(t) , z˜(t)−z(t)=
[
x˜(t)
v˜(t)
]
−
[
x(t)
v(t)
]
=
[
x˘(t)
v˘(t)
]
, (15a)
y˘ (t) , y˜ (t)− y (t) , (15b)
Pσ(tk) ,
[
η12n×2n −Aσ(tk) 12n×2n
−C 0|M|×2n
]
, (15c)
z˘ (t) , e
A
σ(tk)
(t−tk)
k−1∏
o=0
eAσ(to)(to+1−to)z˘ (0) , (15d)
g ,
[
0⊤n g1 . . . gn
]
, (15e)
Ok ,
[
C⊤
(
CAσ(tk)
)⊤
. . .
(
CA2n−1
σ(tk)
)⊤]⊤
. (15f)
Nkk = ker (Om) , (15g)
Nkq = ker(Oq)
⋂
e−Aσ(tq)τqNkq+1, 1 ≤ q ≤ k − 1. (15h)
Algorithm 1: Attack-Starting Time ρ
Input: Sets: Nk1 recursively computed by (15g)
and (15h), and
Sk,
{
t :
[
z˘ (t)
−g
]
∈ker(Pσ(tk)), t∈ [tk,tk+1]} (16)
with Pσ(tk), z˘ (t), g and Ok defined in (15).
1 if z˘ (0) 6∈ Nk1 then
2 Choose ρ = tk at current tk;
3 else
4 if max
t∈Sk
{t} 6= tk+1 then
5 Choose ρ ∈ Sk at current tk;
6 else
7 Choose ρ at current tk or next tk+1.
8 end
9 end
Proposition 1: Under time-dependent topology switch-
ing (14), the action “start attack” of ZDA in the system (11)
does not affect the stealthy property (6) if and only if the
attack-starting time ρ is generated by Algorithm 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
D. Strategy on Switching Times
Inspired by [25], the core of defense strategy proposed in
this paper is to make changes on system dynamics through
changing communication topology such that the attack pol-
icy (4) is not feasible. In the realistic situation where the
defender has no knowledge of the attack-starting times, to
detect ZDA we must consider infinitely changing topology
over infinite time. The strategy on switching times described
by the following lemma, which are studied in Part I paper
and will also be used for observer design in this Part II paper,
addresses the problem: when should the topology of multi-
agent system (8) switch to detect ZDA, such that the changes
in the system dynamics do not destroy system stability in the
absence of attacks?
5Lemma 1: [1] Consider the second-order multi-agent sys-
tem (8). For the given topology set S that satisfies
∀r ∈ S :
√
λi (Lr)
λj (Lr) ∈ Q, for ∀i, j = 2, . . . , n (17)
and the scalars 1 > β > 0, α > 0 and κ ∈ N, if the dwell
times τr, r ∈ S, satisfy
τr = τ̂max +m
Tr
2
,m ∈ N (18)
where 0 < τ̂max <
− ln β
α
, 0 < τ̂max+
mTr
2 −
(
β−
1
κ − 1
)
κ
α−ξ ,
ξ < α, ξ = max
r∈S,i=1,...,n
{1− λi (Lr),−1 + λi (Lr)} and
Tr = lcm
(
2π√
λi(Lr)
; i = 2, ..., n
)
, then the asymptotic
second-order consensus is achieved.
Remark 3: Let us assume that at time t−k , system (11)
or (13) is already at the steady state. It verifies that under the
attack signal (3), at the topology-switching time tk, x(tk) =
x(t−k ) and v(tk) = v(t
−
k ), and the system maintains its steady
state at tk, which means topology switching does not have
impulsive effect on the systems (11) and (13). We should note
that the defense strategy (strategic topology switching) that
will be developed in the following sections cannot be directly
applied to such multi-agent systems that topology switching
has impulsive effect.
IV. DETECTABILITY OF ZERO-DYNAMICS ATTACK
This section focuses on the detectability of ZDA, which will
answer the question: what topologies of multi-agent system (8)
to switch to such that the attack policy (4) is not feasible? To
better illustrate the strategy on switching topologies, we intro-
duce the definitions of components in a graph and difference
graph.
Definition 3 (Components of Graph [36]): The components
of a graph are its maximal connected subgraphs. A component
is said to be trivial if it has no edges; otherwise, it is a
nontrivial component.
Definition 4: The difference graph Grsdiff = (V
rs
diff,E
rs
diff) of
two graphs Gr and Gs is generated as
Vrsdiff = Vr ∪ Vs
(i, j) ∈ Ersdiff, if arij − asij 6= 0
where Vr and a
r
ij are the set of vertices (agents) and the entry
of weighted adjacency matrix of the graph Gr, respectively.
We define the union difference graph for switching differ-
ence graphs as:
Gdiff ,
 ⋃
r,s∈S
Vrsdiff,
⋃
r,s∈S
Ersdiff
 . (19)
We use Ci(Gdiff) to denote the set of agents in i
th component
of union difference graph Gdiff. Obviously, V = C1
⋃
C2⋃
. . .
⋃
Cd, and Cp
⋂
Cq = ∅ if p 6= q, where d is the
number of the component of graph Gdiff. As an example, the
difference graph in Figure 1 has two nontrivial components,
C1(Gdiff) = {1, 2, 3, 4}, C2(Gdiff) = {5, 6}, and two trivial
components, C3(Gdiff) = {7}, C4(Gdiff) = {8}.
Figure 1. Components of difference graph (the weights of communications
links are uniformly set as ones).
In the following theorem, we present the strategy on switch-
ing topologies.
Theorem 1: Consider the multi-agent system (11). Under
time-dependent topology switching, the ZDA can be detected
by defender without knowledge of the numbder of misbe-
having agents and the attack-starting time, if and only if
each component of union difference graph has at least one
monitored agent, i.e.,
Ci(Gdiff) ∩M 6= ∅, ∀i = 1, . . .d. (20)
Proof: Under result of time-dependent topology switch-
ing (14), from (11) and (13), we have:
˙˘z (t) = Aσ(t)z˘ (t) + g (t) , (21a)
y˘ (t) = Cz˘ (t) , (21b)
where z˘ (t) and y˘ (t) are given by (15a) and (15b), respectively.
Let us define:
Pr =
[
η12n×2n −Ar 12n×2n
−C 0|M|×2n
]
. (22)
(Sufficient Condition) We now assume to the contrary that
the system (11) is under ZDA. By Definition 1, we obtain[
z˘(ρ)
−g(ρ)
]
∈ ker(Pσ(ρ)) . (23)
By the resulted state (7) and the form of ZDA signal (3),
we obtain that
[z˘ (t) ,−g(t)] = eη(t−ρ) [z˘ (ρ) ,−g(ρ)] , t ≥ ρ.
Since eη(t−ρ) 6= 0, we conclude that system (11) has ZDA is
equivalent to [
z˘(ρ)
−g(ρ)
]
∈
⋂
r∈S
ker (Pr). (24)
6Substituting C in (12b), z˘ (ρ) in (15a), g(ρ) in (12d)
with (12e), Ar in (12a), and Pr in (22) into (24) and expanding
it out yieldsη1n×n−1n×n 0n×n 0n×nLr η1n×n 0n×n 1n×n
−e⊤j 0⊤n 0⊤n 0⊤n


x˘(ρ)
v˘(ρ)
0n
−a (ρ)
=
0n0n
0
 ,∀j∈M,∀r∈S
which is equivalent to
ηx˘ (ρ)− v˘ (ρ) = 0n, (25)
−a (ρ) + Lrx˘ (ρ) + ηv˘(ρ) = 0n,∀r ∈ S (26)
−a (ρ) + Lsx˘ (ρ) + ηv˘(ρ) = 0n,∀s ∈ S (27)
x˘j (ρ) = 0, ∀j ∈ M. (28)
Through elementary row transformation, the Laplacian ma-
trix of union difference graph Gdiff can be written as
L˜ , diag {L (C1(Gdiff)) , . . . ,L (Cd(Gdiff))} , (29)
where L (Cq(Gdiff)), q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, denote the Laplacian
matrix of the qth component.
Noting that equation (26) subtracting equation (27) results
in (Lr − Ls) x˘ (κ) = 0n, ∀r, s ∈ S, which is equivalent to
L˜x˘ (κ) = 0n, (30)
where L˜ is defined in (29). From [37], it is known that the
Laplacian matrix of component L (Cq(Gdiff)) has properties:
i) zero is one of its eigenvalues with multiplicity one, ii)
the eigenvector that corresponds to the eigenvalue zero is
1|Cq(Gdiff)|, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , d}. It follows from (28) and (20)
that the solution of (30) is obtained as x˘ (ρ) = 0n, which
works with (25) implies that v˘ (ρ) = 0n, substituting which
into (26) or (27) yields the same result as a (ρ) = 0n, which, in
conjunction with (12d), implies g (ρ) = 02n, indicating there
is no ZDA by Definition 1. Thus, a contradiction occurs.
(Necessary Condition) Substituting (25) into (26) yields(Lr + η21n×n) x˘ (ρ) = a (ρ) , ∀r ∈ S, which is equivalent to
(
|S|∑
r=1
αrLr + η21n×n)x˘ (ρ) = a (ρ) , (31a)
∀αr > 0,
|S|∑
r=1
αr = 1. (31b)
If Im (η) 6= 0, (25) shows that
∃i ∈ V : Im (x˘i (ρ)) 6= 0 or Im (v˘i (ρ)) 6= 0,
which contradicts with v˘ (ρ) ∈ Rn and x˘ (ρ) ∈ Rn in the
definition of ZDA. Therefore, in the following proof, we need
to consider only the cases of (Im (η) = 0, Re (η) = 0) and
(Im (η) = 0, Re (η) 6= 0).
Case One–(Im (η) = 0, Re (η) 6= 0): We note that there
exists one implied condition that is the union graph G ,( ⋃
r∈S
Vr,
⋃
r∈S
Er
)
of switching topologies in S is connected;
if not, the asymptotic second-order consensus cannot be
achieved, which is undesirable. It is straightforward to verify
that if the condition (20) is not satisfied, the equation (30) has
the solution that has non-identical entries. Moreover, if η 6= 0,
|S|∑
r=1
αrLr + η21n×n is full-rank for ∀αr > 0,
|S|∑
r=1
αr = 1.
Thus, we obtain a feasible non-zero vector a (ρ) from (31a).
Case Two–(Im (η) = 0, Re (η) = 0): If the condition (20)
is not satisfied, the equation (30) has the solution with non-
identical entries. Moreover, the union graph of all switching
topologies is connected means that the eigenvector associated
with eigenvalue zero of
|S|∑
r=1
αrLr is the only 1n, for any αr >
0,
|S|∑
r=1
αr = 1. Therefore, from (31a) with η = 0, we obtain a
feasible non-zero vector a (ρ), which completes the proof of
necessary condition.
Remark 4: The strategy (20) in Theorem 1 implies that the
minimum number of monitored agents required to detect ZDA
is equivalent to the number of components of union difference
graph. Take the difference graph in Figure 1 as an example,
which has four components: two nontrivial components and
two trivial components. Therefore, if the topology set S
includes only Graph One and Graph Two in Figure 1, |M| ≥ 4.
V. ATTACK DETECTION ALGORITHM
Based on the obtained detectability of ZDA, this section
focus on its detection algorithm.
A. Luenberger Observer under Switching Topology
We now present a Luenberger observer [38] for the sys-
tem (9):
x˙i(t)=vi(t) (32a)
v˙i(t)=
n∑
i=1
a
σ(t)
ij (xj(t)−xi(t))−
{
ψiri(t)+θir˙i(t), i∈M
0, i∈V\M (32b)
ri(t)=xi(t)− y˜i(t), i∈V\M (32c)
where y˘i(t) is the output of monitored agent i in system (9),
ri (t) is the attack-detection signal, ψi and θi are the observer
gains designed by the defender, x(t0) = x˘(t0), v(t0) = v˘(t0).
We define the tracking errors as ex (t) , x (t) − x˜ (t) and
ev (t) , v (t) − v˜ (t). A dynamics of tracking errors with
attack-detection signal is obtained from (32) and (9):
e˙x (t) = ev (t) , (33a)
e˙v (t) = −
(Lσ(t)+Φ) ex (t)−Θev (t)−a (t) , (33b)
r (t) = Cex (t) , (33c)
where a (t) is defined in (12e), r (t) , y (t)− y˜(t), and
Φ , diag{ψ1, . . . , ψ|M|, 0, . . . , 0} ∈ Rn×n, (34)
Θ , diag{θ1, . . . , θ|M|, 0, . . . , 0} ∈ Rn×n. (35)
The strategy (13) in Theorem 1 implies that if the union dif-
ference graph is connected, i.e., the union difference graph has
only one component, using only one monitored agent’s output
is sufficient to detect ZDA. The following result regarding
the stability of system (33) in the absent of attack will answer
the question: under what condition only one monitored agent’s
7output is sufficient for the observer (32) to asymptotically track
the system (9) in the absent of attack?
Theorem 2: Consider the following matrix:
As ,
[
0n×n 1n×n
−Ls − Φ −Θ
]
, (36)
where Ls is the Laplacian matrix of a connected undirected
graph, the gain matrices Φ and Θ defined in (34) and (35)
satisfy
0n×n 6= Φ ≥ 0, (37)
0n×n 6= Θ ≥ 0. (38)
As is Hurwitz for any |M| ≥ 1, if and only if Ls has distinct
eigenvalues.
Proof: See Appendix C.
B. Strategic Switching Topology For Detection
The observer (32) can also be modeled as a switched system
as well. Let us recall a technical lemma that can address
the problem: when the topology of observer (32) should
strategically switch such that it can asymptotically track the
real system (9) in the absence of attacks.
Lemma 2: [39] Consider the switched systems:
x˙ (t) = Aσ(t)x (t) .
under periodic switching, i.e., σ (t) = σ (t+ τ ) ∈ S. If there
exists a convex combination of some matrix measure that
satisfies
L∑
m=1
νmµ (Am) < 0, (39)
then the switched system system is uniformly asymptotically
stable for every positive τ .
The strategic topology-switching algorithm is described by
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Strategic Topology-Switching Algorithm
Input: Initial index k = 0, initial time tk = 0, an ordered
topology set S that satisfies (39) and
∃s ∈ S : Ls has distinct eigenvalues, (40)
dwell times τs, s ∈ S, generated by (18) that
satisfy ∑
s∈S
νsµP (As) < 0, νs = τs∑
r∈S
τr
. (41)
1 Run the multi-agent system (9) and the observer (32);
2 Switch topology of system (9) and its observer (32) at
time tk + τσ(tk): σ(tk)← S (mod(k + 1, |S|) + 1);
3 Update topology-switching time: tk ← tk + τσ(tk);
4 Update index: k ← k + 1;
5 Go to Step 2.
Theorem 3: Consider the multi-agent system (9) and the
observer (32), where the observer gain matrices Φ and Θ
satisfy (37) and (38), and the topology-switching signal σ(tk)
of the observer (32) and the system (9) are generated by
Algorithm 2.
i) Without knowledge of the misbehaving agents and
the attack-starting time, the observer (32) is able to
detect ZDA in system (9), i.e., r(t) ≡ 0|M| does not
holds, if and only if the set of monitored agents and
switching topologies satisfy (20).
ii) In the absence of attacks, without constraint on
the magnitudes of observer gains, the observer (32)
asymptotically track the real system (9), i.e., the
system (33) is globally uniformly asymptotically
stable.
iii) In the absence of attacks, the agents in system (9)
achieve the asymptotic second-order consensus.
Proof: We first note that Line 3 and 5 of Algorithm 2
imply the topology-switching signal σ(t) is time-dependent.
Proof of i): Replacing Aσ(t) by Aσ(t) (defined in (36)) in
the steps to derive (25)–(28) in the proof of Theorem 1, we
have
ηex (ρ)− ev (ρ) = 0n, (42)
a (ρ) + Lrex (ρ) + ηex(ρ) = 0n,∀r ∈ S (43)
a (ρ) + Lsex (ρ) + ηex(ρ) = 0n,∀s ∈ S (44)
exj (ρ) = 0, ∀j ∈M. (45)
Therefore, the rest of the proof of i) follows that of Theorem 1
straightforwardly.
Proof of ii): In the absence of attacks, the system matrix
of system (33) is Aσ(t) defined in (36). Considering (41), by
Lemma 2, and the conditions (37) and (38), As is Hurwitz.
Thus, there exists P > 0 such that µP (As) < 0. Through
setting on the switching times (dwell times) by (18), (39) can
be satisfied. By Lemma 2, the switched linear system (33) is
uniformly asymptotically stable, which is, in fact, equivalent
to globally uniformly asymptotically stable.
Proof of iii) follows Lemma 1 straightforwardly.
VI. SIMULATION
We consider a system with n = 4 agents. The initial position
and velocity conditions are chosen randomly as x(0) = v(0) =
[1, 2, 3, 4]
⊤
. The considered network topologies with their
coupling weights are given in Figure 2. The working situation
is illustrated by Figure 2 as:
• Agents 2–4 are misbehaving agents, i.e., K = {2, 3, 4};
• only agent 1 is the monitored one, i.e., M = {1}.
Property ii) in Theorem 3 states that our strategic topology
switching has no constraint on the magnitudes of observer
gains in tracking real system. To demonstrate this, we set the
observer gains significantly small as
Φ = Θ = diag{10−6, 0, 0, 0}. (46)
A. Undetectable Zero-Dynamics Attack
First, we consider the topology set S = {1, 2}, and set the
topology switching sequence as 1 → 2 → 1 → 2 → . . .,
periodically. It verifies from Figure 2 that the topology set
8Figure 2. Working situation.
S = {1, 2} satisfies (17) and (41). By Lemma 1, we select
the dwell times τ1 = τ2 =
T1
2 + 0.2 =
T2
2 + 0.2 =
π
2 + 0.2.
It verifies from Topologies One and Two in Figure 2 that
their generated difference graph is disconnected. Thus, the set
S = {1, 2} does not satisfy (20) in Theorem 1. Therefore, the
attacker can easily design a ZDA such that the observer (32)
under Algorithm 2 fails to detect it.
Let the attacker’s goal be to make the system working
under Algorithm 2 unstable, without being detected. Following
the policy (4) and the attack-starting time selection scheme–
Algorithm 1, one of its attack strategies is designed as:
• η = 0.0161;
• modify the data of initial condition sent to observer (32)
as x̂ (0) = [1, 1, 3, 5]⊤ and v̂ (0) = [1, 1, 4, 4]⊤;
• choose attack-starting time ρ = 1097.4;
• introduce ZDA signal to system at ρ:
g (t)=10−3
[
0, 7.3eη(t−ρ), 7.3eη(t−ρ),−14.6eη(t−ρ)]⊤.
The trajectories of detection signal r(t) designed in (32),
and the velocities are shown in Figure 3, which illustrates
that the attacker’s goal of making the system unstable without
being detected is achieved under the topology set S = {1, 2}.
B. Detectable Zero-Dynamics Attack
To detect the designed stealthy attack, we now incor-
porate Topology Three in Figure 2 into topology set, i.e.,
S = {1, 2, 3}. We let the topology switching sequence to
be 1 → 2 → 3 → 1 → 2 → 3 → . . ., periodically. It
verifies that the topology set S = {1, 2, 3} satisfies (17)
and (41). Using Lemma 1, the dwell times are selected as
τ1 = τ2 = τ3 =
π
2 + 0.2.
We note that in the working situation illustrated by Figure 2,
the existing results [12], [19]–[22] for the multi-agent systems
under fixed topology fail to detect ZDA. This is mainly due
to the misbehaving-agents set |K| = 3; the connectivities of
Topologies One, Two and Three are as the same as 1; and the
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Figure 3. States v˜(t): multi-agent system under attack is unstable; attack-
detection signal r(t): the attack keeps stealthy over time.
output set |M| = 1. All these violate the conditions on the
connectivity of the communication network, the size of the
misbehaving-agent set, and the size of the output set, which
are summarized in Table I.
It verifies from Figure 2 that the difference graph generated
by Topologies One and Three, or Topologies Two and Three
is connected. Thus, by property i) in Theorem 3, we conclude
that using only one monitored agent’s output, the observer (32)
working under Algorithm 2 is able to detect the designed ZDA
under the topology set S = {1, 2, 3}.
The trajectory of the attack-detection signal r(t) is shown
in Figure 4. Remark 3 states that when the starting time of
ZDA is not the initial time, the proposed attack policy includes
two mixed stealthy attacks. Figure 4 illustrates that using only
agent 1’s output, the mixed stealthy attacks are successfully
detected.
C. Observer in The Absence of Attacks
We now show the effectiveness of strategic topology switch-
ing for the observer (32) in estimating the states of the multi-
agent system (8), i.e., the multi-agent system (9) in the absence
of attacks. Input the initial conditions modified by attacker
to the observer (32), i.e., x (0) = x̂ (0) = [1, 1, 3, 5]
⊤
and
v (0) = v̂ (0) = [1, 1, 4, 4]
⊤
. The trajectories of observer
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Attack that modifies initial condition is detected.
Attack-starting time of zero-dynamics attack is  = 1097.4.
Zero-dynamics attack is detected.
Figure 4. Attack-detection signal r(t): using only one monitored agent’s
output, the designed ZDA is detected.
errors are shown in Figure 5, which shows that using the
significantly small observer gains in (46) and only agent 1’s
output, Algorithm 2 works successfully for the observer (32) to
asymptotically track the real multi-agent system in the absence
of attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
This two-part paper studies strategic topology switching for
the second-order multi-agent system under attack. In Part-I
paper [1], for the simplified control protocol that does need
velocity measurements, we propose a strategy on switching
times that addresses the problem: when the topology should
switch such that the changes in system dynamics do not
undermine agent’s ability of reaching the second consensus
in the absence of attacks. In Part-II paper, we propose a
strategy on switching topologies that addresses the problem:
what topology to switch to, such that the ZDA can be detected.
Based on the two strategies, a defense strategy is derived in
this Part-II paper, its merits are summarized as
• In achieving the second-order consensus in the absence
of attacks, the control protocol does not need the velocity
measurements, while the algorithm has no constraint on
the magnitudes of coupling weights.
• In tracking real systems in the absence of attack, it has
no constraint on the magnitudes of observer gains of
the proposed Luenberger observer and the number of
monitored agents.
• In detecting ZDA, the algorithm has no constraint on the
size of misbehaving-agent set, while the algorithm allows
the defender to have no knowledge of the attack-starting
time.
The theoretical results obtained in this two-part paper imply
several rather interesting results:
• for the size of switching topology set, there exists a
fundamental tradeoff between the topology connection
cost and the convergence speed to consensus;
• for the dwell time of switching topologies, there exist a
tradeoff between the switching cost and the duration of
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Figure 5. In the absence of attacks, trajectories of observer errors under
Algorithm 2 are globally uniformly asymptotically stable.
attacks going undetected, and the convergence speed to
consensus.
Analyzing the tradeoff problems in the lights of game theory
and multi-objective optimization constitutes a part of our
future research.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
From the attack signal (3), we know that g(t) = 0o¯ for t ∈
[0, ρ). Thus, before the attack-starting time ρ, the system (2)
is described by
˙˜z (t) = Az˜ (t) , (47a)
y˜ (t) = Cz˜ (t) , t ∈ [0, ρ) (47b)
from which the first item in (7) is obtained by integration.
It is straightforward to derive from (47) and (1) that
˙˜z (t)− z˙ (t) = A (z˜ (t)− z (t)) (48a)
y˜ (t)− y (t) = C (z˜ (t)− z (t)) , t ∈ [0, ρ). (48b)
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We note that (6) implies y˜ (t)− y (t) = C (z˜ (t)− z (t)) =
0m¯ for all t ∈ [0, ρ), which means z˜(0) − z(0) 6= 0n¯ is
unobservable under the dynamics (48). Thus, z˜ (0)− z (0) ∈
ker (O), i.e., the policy (4a) holds.
Considering the fact that the system (2) under the attack sig-
nal (3) is continuous w.r.t. time, which implies z˜(ρ−) = z˜(ρ).
Therefore, z˜(ρ) − z(ρ) = eAρ(z˜(0) − z(0)) can be obtained
from (48). The results (6) and (7) over the time interval [ρ,∞)
are generated through launching the classical ZDA signal
g(t) = geη(t−ρ), t ≥ ρ, the detailed proof can be found in [40],
it is omitted here.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Under the result of time-dependent topology switching (14),
from (11) and (13), we obtain a dynamics:
˙˘z (t) = Aσ(t)z˘ (t) , (49a)
y˘ (t) = Cz˘ (t) , t ∈ [0, ρ) (49b)
where z˘ and y˘ (t) are given in (15a) and (15b), respectively.
It follows from the dynamics (49) that the solution (15d) is
obtained by integration.
Without loss of generality, we let [0, ρ] = [0, t1)∪ [t1, t2)∪
. . . ∪ [tk, ρ) with ρ ≤ tk+1, k ∈ N0. (49) implies the stealthy
property: y (t) = y˜ (t) for all t ∈ [0, ρ], is equivalent to
y˘ (t) = 0|M|, for all t ∈ [0, t1) ∪ . . . ∪ [tk, ρ). (50)
We note that (50) means that the system (49) is unobservable
for any t ∈ [t0, t+k ), k ∈ N0, which is further equivalent to
z˘ (0) ∈ Nk1 with Nk1 recursively computed by (15g) and (15h),
via considering Theorem 1 of [41]. The condition in Lines 1
and 2 of Algorithm 1 means that once the attacker finds (50)
does not hold at tk, he must immediately launches ZDA signal
to keep stealthy, i.e., ρ = tk; otherwise, y˘ (tk) 6= 0|M|. If (50)
holds, the attacker can launch the ZDA at future time, i.e.,
ρ > tk.
The set defined in (16) and the condition “max
t∈Sk
{t} = tk+1”
contained in Line 6 of Algorithm 1 implies that the selection
of ρ also dependents on whether ZDA policy (4b) is feasible
at ρ, so that its stealthy property can continue to hold. Line
7 of Algorithm 1 implies that if it is feasible at the incoming
switching time tk+1, the attacker can launch the ZDA signal
at current activated time interval [tk, tk+1) or next interval
[tk+1, tk+2). Otherwise, the attacker must launch the ZDA at
a time in the current time interval, i.e., ρ ∈ Sk.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We let σ(t) = s ∈ S for t ∈ [tk, tk+1), k ∈ N0. Since Ls is
the Laplacian matrix of a connected graph and Φ ≥ 0, Ls+Φ
is positive definite. We define the following positive function
for the system (33) with a(t) ≡ 0n:
Vs(e (t))=
1
2
e⊤x (t)(Ls+Φ) ex(t)+e⊤v (t) ev(t) .
Its time derivative is obtained as
V˙s (e (t)) = −e⊤v (t)Θev (t) ≤ 0, (51)
where the inequality is obtained by considering Θ ≥ 0.
Since the dynamics (33) with a(t) ≡ 0n is equivalent to
e˙ (t) = Ase (t) with e (t) ,
[
e⊤x (t) e
⊤
v (t)
]⊤
, we conclude
from (51) that none of the eigenvalues of Ar has positive real
part.
We next prove Ar has neither zero nor pure imagine
eigenvalues.
Using the well-known formula det
([
A B
C D
])
=
det (A) det
(
D − CA−1B), from (36) we have:
det (As − λ12n×2n)
= det
([ −λ1n×n 1|V|×|V|
−Ls − Φ −Θ− λ1n×n
])
= det (−λ1n×n) det
(
−Θ− λ1n×n − Ls +Φ
λ
)
= det
(
λ21n×n +Θλ+ Ls +Φ
)
. (52)
Let us define:
φm ,
√
ψm + λθmem, (53)
with em ∈ Rn being the mth vector of the canonical basis. It
verifies from (53), (34) and (35) that
P(m) , λΘ̂(m) + Φ̂(m) =
|M|∑
p=m
φpφ
⊤
p , (54)
with
Θ̂(m) , diag
{
0, . . . , 0, θm, . . . , θ|M|, 0, . . . 0
}
,
Φ̂(m) , diag
{
0, . . . , 0, ψm, . . . , ψ|M|, 0, . . . 0
}
.
Let us recall the well-known formula:
det
(
A+ χuw⊤
)
= det (A)
(
1 + χw⊤A−1u
)
, (55)
where A is invertible, and w and u are vectors. By (55), we
obtain from (52) and (53)–(55) that
det (As − λ12n×2n)
=
|M|∏
m=1
(
1 + φ⊤m(Hs + P (m+ 1))−1φm
)
det (Hs) , (56)
where
Hs , λ21n×n + Ls. (57)
Since Lr is a symmetric matrix, there exists an or-
thogonal matrix Q , [q1; . . . ; qn] ∈ R|V|×|V| with qi ,[
qi1 qi2 . . . qi|V|
]⊤ ∈ R|V|, i ∈ V, such that
Q⊤ = Q−1, (58a)
Q⊤HsQ = diag
{
λ2 + λ1(Ls), . . . , λ2 + λn(Ls)
}
. (58b)
Considering (38) and (35), without loss of generality, we let
θ|M| 6= 0. (59)
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It follows from (58) and (53) that
φ⊤|M|(Hs)−1φ|M| =
n∑
i=1
(
ψ|M| + λθ|M|
)
q2i|M|
λi (Ls) + λ2 , (60)
det (Hs) =
n∏
i=1
(
λi (Ls) + λ2
)
, (61)
from which, we arrive at(
1 + φ⊤|M|(Hs)−1φ|M|
)
det (Hs)
=
n∏
i=1
(
λi (Ls) + λ2
)
+
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj (Ls) + λ2
) (
ψ|M| + λθ|M|
)
q2i|M|. (62)
Let us define:
Q (λ) ,
|M|−1∏
m=1
(
1 + φ⊤m(Hs + P (m+ 1))−1φm
)
. (63)
Substituting (62) and (63) into (56) yields
det (As − λ12n×2n)
= Q (λ)
(
n∏
i=1
(
λi (Ls) + λ2
)
+
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj (Ls) + λ2
)(
ψ|M|+λθ|M|
)
q2i|M|
 . (64)
In the followings, we consider two different cases.
A. Case One: Ar has zero eigenvalue
In this case, i.e., λ = 0, it follows from (53), (54), (57), (63)
and the condition θm ≥ 0 and ψm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈
M, that Q (λ) > 0. Thus, we conclude from (64) that
det (As − λ12n×2n)|λ=0 > 0. Therefore, Ar does not have
any zero eigenvalue. A contradiction occurs.
B. Case Two: Ar has pure imagine eigenvalue
This case means λ = ̟i with 0 6= ̟ ∈ R. It verifies
from (53), (54) and (57) that
1 + φ⊤m(Hs + P (m+ 1))−1φm 6= 0, ∀m ∈ M
thus, Q (λ)|λ=̟i 6= 0. Then, we conclude from (64) that
det (As − i̟12n×2n) = 0 is equivalent to
n∏
i=1
(
λi(Ls)−̟2
)
+
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj(Ls)−̟2
)
ψ|M|q
2
i|M|
+ i
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj (Ls)−̟2
)
̟θ|M|q
2
i|M| = 0. (65)
We note that (65) implies
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj (Ls)−̟2
)
̟θ|M|q
2
i|M| = 0, (66)
which, in conjunction with (59), results in
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj (Ls)−̟2
)
̟q2i|M| = 0,
which further implies that
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj(Ls)−̟2
)
ψ|M|q
2
i|M| = 0.
Thus, from (65) we have
n∏
i=1
(
λi(Ls)−̟2
)
= 0, which means
that
∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ̟2 = λi (Ls). (67)
However, it is straightforward to verify from (67) that
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
(
λj (Ls)−̟2
)
̟θ|M|q
2
i|M| 6= 0 if and only if Ls has
distinct eigenvalues. Consequently, (65) does hold, thus a
contradiction occurs.
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